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Questions - Fixed Networks: Section
3 - Question 11
Question 11: Will the specialist facilities-less
service providers survive?
Important questions arise regarding the future of specialist
facilities-less service providers. As is shown in Industry Mapping 3: Companies by Layer these are
companies that do not have their own networks but depend on those of others in
order to provide services primarily in Layers III, IV and V.
Since the liberalisation of telecoms markets - beginning in the
mid-1980s in the US, UK and Japan such companies have played an
important role in the new telecoms industry. This category of player includes
several types of company such as:
| Facilities-less
Service Providers |
| Callback companies that take advantage of
cheaper rates in other countries in order to connect the two parties to a call
from the cheaper country |
| Resellers who buy network services in the
wholesale market, repackage and resell them |
| Internet access providers (IAPs) |
| Internet service providers (ISPs) |
| Online information providers such as AOL Time
Warner and MSN that provide content in addition to internet access
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| Financial information providers like Bloomberg
and Reuters |
| Browser and search engine providers such as
Netscape and Yahoo |
But when is it necessary for specialist facilities-less service
providers to integrate backwards and build or buy their own networks?
There are prominent examples of companies that began without facilities
but then decided to build and buy their own networks. One of the most prominent
was WorldCom that began life as a reseller of long-distance services and then
after several years began to construct its own network. The reason for the
change in strategy was the realisation that the opportunity for arbitrage
inherent in resale would increasingly be squeezed by market forces.
WorldCom began operations in 1984, the year that AT&T was divested
by the US authorities. At that time resale was highly profitable. Excess
capacity existed in the network services market since original new entrants
such as MCI and Sprint were building their own networks at a time when voice
was the main form of traffic and was only growing slowly. This meant that
attractive wholesale rates were available.
On the demand side, however, the price of long-distance calls was high,
partly because AT&T had been a high-cost monopoly carrier and faced no
competition. However, while this meant initially high profitability for
WorldCom, Bernie Ebbers and his colleagues realised that this would soon change
as capacity utilisation grew due to enhanced demand for carrying capacity for
voice and, increasingly, data and as competition reduced long-distance rates.
By building and buying its own network (through merger and acquisition, funded
by a rapidly rising share price) WorldCom would be able to avoid the high
charges levied for the use of the infrastructure of other carriers.
Interestingly, other new operators, such as Qwest and Level 3 that entered some
five years later, decided from the outset to construct their own networks.
However, there are also prominent examples of service providers who
initially owned their own partial networks - partial in the sense that they
still depended on the facilities of others - but then decided to sell these and
become specialist facilities-less service providers.
One of the best examples involved AOL and Compuserve who owned their
own partial networks but then sold them to WorldCom. Under the deal WorldCom
acquired AOLs network and also the network of Compuserve the rest of
which i.e. the services part - was then absorbed by AOL. AOL decided
that its distinctive competencies and advantages lay in the areas of
information and content and not in the running of networks, an area where its
needs could be adequately met through the efficient markets which existed.
More recent examples illustrate the attraction of having, from the very
outset, nothing whatever to do with owning and running networks. One example is
Freeserve that has now become the largest ISP in the UK, outdoing the
incumbent, BT, and AOL Time Warner which is a significant player in Europe.
Freeserve was established by Dixons, a leading retailer of consumer electronics
including PCs. Freeserve provided the UKs first free internet
access, that is no charge was levied by the company as an ISP although the user
still had to pay the cost of the local call which was based on time. Most of
the carrying and connecting i.e. the telecoms function was
provided by Energis, the new operator subsidiary of the English National Power
Grid, and its acquired subsidiary, the ISP Planet Online. Under a revenue
sharing agreement sanctioned by the regulator, Oftel, Dixons and Energis shared
local call revenues with BT who provided most of the local access.
A second example of a specialist facilities-less service provider, also
from the UK, is Virgins mobile subsidiary established by Richard Branson.
This company began offering services in the UK in the latter part of 1999.
However, all of the mobile network services are provided by One2One. This
mobile operator, together with Orange, were given the third and fourth mobile
licences in the UK to challenge the incumbents Vodafone and Cellnet (now
wholly-owned by BT) that earlier had been awarded the first two
licences. Interestingly, Virgins mobile subsidiary is 51 per cent owned
by Virgin and 49 per cent by One2One, a company that was acquired in 1999 by
Deutsche Telekom. If Virgin succeeds in this venture it will have proved that
it is possible for a specialist facilities-less service provider to compete
profitably with rivals that own their own networks.
In Virgins case, One2One is both a rival, offering identical
competing services, as well as a supplier of its mobile network services. In
this case the explanation for success, if it comes, is the consumer brand-name
that Virgin enjoys which gives it a certain amount of market appeal. Dixons, as
a well-known high-street retailer and with many easily accessible outlets,
enjoys a similar brand-name advantage.
But do examples such as those of AOL Time Warner, Freeserve and Virgin
Mobile provide supporting evidence for the hypothesis that being a specialist
facilities-less service provider is a viable long-term business strategy?
Or will counter-evidence emerge in due course from network operators
who, with a base in the network layer (i.e. Layer II, see Industry Mapping) and owning and controlling their own
networks, decide to vertically integrate into the services layers? Vertical
integration was discussed earlier in Question 6.
Will these network operators enjoy a competitive advantage in the
provision of services through having access to cheaper networks and perhaps
through having direct control of their own facilities, therefore being able to
provide superior services such as reliability, security and flexibility?
Or will the specialist facilities-less service providers be able to
count on strong competition in the network facilities market to be able to
compete effectively with the network operators when offering services?
If you wish to express your views on questions such as these go to the
Workshop (Area 2). To
compare your visions with those of others go to Vision Check.
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